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California cities have the least affordable hous-
ing and the most congested traffic in the nation.
California’s housing crisis results directly from sev-
eral little-known state institutions, including local
agency formation commissions (LAFCos), which
regulate annexations and the formation of new
cities and service districts; the California
Environmental Quality Act, which imposes high
costs on new developments; and a 1971 state plan-
ning law that effectively entitles any resident in the
state to a say in how property owners in the state
use their land. Cities such as San Jose have manip-
ulated these institutions and laws with the goal of
maximizing their tax revenues. 
Meanwhile, California’s transportation plan-
ning has allowed transit agencies, such as San
Jose’s Valley Transportation Authority and Los
Angeles’ Metropolitan Transportation Authority,
to hijack tax revenues that were originally dedicat-
ed to highways so they can build rail empires that
will do little or nothing to relieve congestion. New
highway construction in the 1990s cut San Jose
congestion in half, but congestion is again worsen-
ing as funds once spent on highways are now
diverted to expensive and little-used rail transit
projects.
California should change its planning laws to
forbid cities and counties from conspiring to drive
up housing prices in order to maximize tax rev-
enues. California and its urban areas should also
fund transportation out of user fees instead of
taxes, thus making transportation more respon-
sive to the needs of users instead of politically pow-
erful special interest groups. Other states should
avoid passing laws that create similar conditions.
These recommendations and eight others in this
report will greatly improve the livability of San Jose
and other California urban areas.
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Introduction
California is a garden of Eden, 
A paradise to live in or see; 
But believe it or not, you won’t find it so hot 
If you ain’t got the do re mi.
—Woody Guthrie
California’s scenic beauty, mild climate, and
economic opportunities have attracted more
than 36 million people. But, as suggested by
Woody Guthrie’s song, California’s economic
opportunities have been restricted by the
state’s high cost of living. Most notably,
California cities have the least-affordable hous-
ing and worst traffic congestion in the country.
The experience of San Jose, the self-pro-
claimed capital of Silicon Valley, reveals how
California achieved these dubious rankings.
Amid some of the fastest-growing industries
in the world, San Jose should be one of the
fastest-growing urban areas in the country.
Thanks to growth-stifling plans and regula-
tions, however, it is one of the slowest.
For example, during the 1990s—a period of
wild growth in the high-tech sector—the San Jose
urban area grew by a paltry 0.7 percent per year.
By comparison, the Las Vegas urban area grew by
6.5 percent per year, Atlanta by 5.0 percent,
Phoenix by 3.8 percent, and Houston by 2.8 per-
cent. Indeed, some 250 U.S. urban areas, includ-
ing Philadelphia, Indianapolis, and even
Baltimore, grew faster than San Jose in the 1990s.1
The plans and rules that have inhibited
San Jose’s growth were supposed to keep the
region livable, reduce urban-service costs,
and save San Jose from becoming like Los
Angeles, the nation’s most-congested and
most-polluted urban area. Instead, these
plans have made San Jose unaffordable, con-
gested, and heavily taxed. Ironically, they
have also made San Jose more like Los
Angeles than almost any other urban area in
the United States.
San Jose’s slow growth is not simply the
result of a debate over growth vs. livability.
Instead, it is the product of several little-
known institutions that are somewhat pecu-
liar to California politics. Two such institu-
tions are the local agency formation commis-
sion (LAFCo) and the congestion manage-
ment agency (CMA).
A 1963 California law required almost
every county in the state to form a LAFCo to
oversee city incorporations, annexations, and
the formation of service districts. Each
LAFCo is generally run by a board dominat-
ed by members of the various city councils in
the county. Because these city governments
have an interest in keeping the taxes generat-
ed by growth within their boundaries, they
have effectively become a tool to use against
so-called sprawl, that is, suburban develop-
ment outside a city’s limits. The result is that
California’s urban areas are the densest,
most-congested, and least-affordable hous-
ing markets in the United States.
Meanwhile, CMAs, which were conceived
in 1990 with the aim of reducing congestion,
have been used in San Jose and other
California regions in ways that actually
increase congestion. In 1984, voters in Santa
Clara County (where San Jose is the county
seat) agreed to a one-half-cent sales tax to be
spent on new highways. In 1990, California
voters agreed to increase gasoline taxes by
nine cents per gallon. That ballot measure
also required every urban county to create a
CMA that would spend the county’s share of
the gas tax to relieve congestion. In 1995,
Santa Clara County merged its CMA with the
county’s transit agency to create the Santa
Clara Valley Transportation Authority. The
CMAs for Los Angeles, Yolo, and other coun-
ties are also run by or closely linked to those
counties’ transit agencies.2
These linkages create a conflict of interest
that leads the transit agencies to use their
authority as the county CMA to capture
transportation funds for transit projects
rather than for highways. Nearly all
California gasoline taxes are dedicated to
highways. But between 1995 and 2000, the
Santa Clara VTA successfully transferred 100
percent of the one-half-cent sales tax from
2
Plans intended to
save San Jose
from becoming
like Los Angeles
have instead
made San Jose
more like Los
Angeles than
almost any other
urban area in 
the U.S.
highways to transit. Now the San Jose region
is poised to spend more than 80 percent of its
transportation funds on the 1 percent of
travel in the region that goes by transit.
Paradoxically, VTA is now both awash
with money for capital improvements and
suffering from one financial crisis after
another due to a shortage of funds to operate
the expensive transit system it is building.
The result has been a 34-percent decline in
transit ridership and several investigations
suggesting that VTA deserves the title of the
nation’s worst-managed transit agency.
No-growth and slow-growth advocates cer-
tainly played a role in inhibiting San Jose’s
growth. But they probably would not have suc-
ceeded were it not for the LAFCos and CMAs
that, ironically, were designed to facilitate
growth and relieve congestion. California
should eliminate LAFCos, separate CMAs
from transit agencies, and reduce other regula-
tions so that San Jose and other regions in the
state can recover from the detrimental effects
of the no-growth plans that have devastated
these regions’ economies.
The Developer’s Paradise
San Jose is California’s oldest city, found-
ed on the banks of the Guadalupe River by
Spanish colonists in 1777. With a population
of under 2,500 people in 1850, the city served
as the state’s first capital. However, it was
quickly eclipsed by San Francisco, which in
1850 had an estimated 25,000 people and by
1870 had 149,000 people to San Jose’s 9,000. 
In 1950, San Francisco was still eight
times larger than San Jose, and Oakland was
four times larger. In the next two decades,
however, San Jose became “the focus of
urbanization in the San Francisco Bay Area.”3
By 1970, it housed more people than
Oakland, and by the late 1980s, its popula-
tion surpassed San Francisco’s.4
This growth is often credited to one man:
A. P. “Dutch” Hamann, San Jose’s city man-
ager from 1950 through 1969. When the city
council hired him in 1950, Hamann was an
auto company middle manager with no pro-
fessional experience in municipal affairs.5 Yet
he had a firm idea of what a city should look
like, and he made San Jose in that image.
Hamann grew up in Orange County, one
of the few urban areas in America that is
more often referred to by its county name
rather than a city name because it has no
dominant, central city. Hamann believed
urban areas should focus on one city, and he
made San Jose into the central city for the
urban area that grew in Santa Clara County
at the south end of San Francisco Bay.6
When Hamann took the reins, San Jose
was a town of 95,000 people at the center of
the productive Santa Clara Valley, a broad
area of flat land that contained more than
100,000 acres of orchards served by San Jose
canneries.7 With the Guadalupe River,
Coyote Creek, and some smaller creeks drain-
ing into San Francisco Bay on the north, the
Santa Clara Valley was surrounded by the
Santa Cruz Mountains on the west and
south and the Diablo Mountains on the east. 
One of the first things Hamann did after
taking the city manager job was persuade the
city’s voters to issue bonds, backed by their
property taxes, to build a sewage treatment
plant to handle all the waste generated by the
canneries and other industry, not to mention
the people. Once in control of the largest
sewage facility in the county, Hamann began
an aggressive program of annexation to fully
utilize and more easily pay for the plant.
Hamann would identify places of likely
growth and send his staff door to door, per-
suading farmers and other residents to be
annexed by San Jose. Some later claimed they
felt coerced, but formally, at least, most of the
annexations were voluntary. In the century
before Hamann was hired, San Jose had
annexed only 42 parcels of land. But in the
1950s the San Jose city council approved 491
annexations, and in the 1960s another 886,
increasing the size of the city from 17 square
miles in 1950 to 136 square miles in 1970.8
Not everyone wanted to be annexed. At
least three cities in Santa Clara County incor-
porated just to avoid being annexed by San
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Jose. Hamann tried to persuade the incorpo-
rated cities of Alviso and Milpitas to merge
with San Jose, succeeding in the case of Alviso
but not Milpitas.9
According to a 1967 planning document,
“Basic council policy has been . . . continued
expansion of the city limits on the valley
floor and surrounding hills until reaching
the boundary of another city or a limiting
topographical feature.”10 One result was that
San Jose’s boundary became highly irregular,
with narrow fingers stretching off in several
directions, detached parcels, and pockets of
unincorporated neighborhoods that resisted
annexation and, to this day, are entirely sur-
rounded by the city. By 1970, San Jose was
bordered by Santa Clara, Cupertino, Los
Gatos, and several other cities on the west,
and by San Francisco Bay and Milpitas on
the north, but it still had plenty of room to
grow toward the east and south. 
Once parcels were annexed, Hamann cre-
ated a “developer’s paradise” by being flexible
about land uses. “By and large,” says one his-
tory book, “the city let developers do what
they wanted wherever they wanted to do it.”11
Though this seems heretical today, in the
1950s it seemed perfectly natural to let prop-
erty owners decide how to use their land.
Hamann also knew that developers, who
were putting their own money and reputa-
tions on the line with each new project, had a
much better idea of what potential buyers
and renters wanted and needed than did city
managers and planners.
Prompted by state and federal require-
ments, Hamann wrote a master plan for the
city, but it was fairly general.12 The city used
zoning, but promised developers “an almost
100 percent probability of favorable rezon-
ing” whenever they wanted a different use
than the city had contemplated.13
To serve the region’s transportation
needs, Hamann urged the state of California
to build more freeways connecting San Jose
with San Francisco and other areas, while he
discouraged the city of San Jose from joining
the Bay Area Rapid Transit district. “A radial
and circumferential system of freeways and
thoroughfares for the entire San Jose metro-
politan area may be of greater value and sig-
nificance than participating in a rapid transit
system which can serve only to shorten the
distance between the San Jose urban center
and San Francisco by a few minutes at best,”
says the 1957 master plan, likely written by
Hamann himself. In 1963, the San Jose city
council formally rejected the offer to be part
of the BART district.14
Hamann’s use of capital improvement
funds raised more questions. To entice people
to accept annexation, San Jose often promised
that they would receive sewer and other ser-
vices at no capital cost. Since voters in the rest
of the city had voted to tax themselves to pay
those capital costs, in effect existing residents
were subsidizing growth. Hamann argued
that, in the long run, the taxes paid by the new
areas would make up for the loss. While such
subsidies might have been necessary to achieve
Hamann’s annexation goals, they fueled an
opposition movement that eventually proved
Hamann’s undoing.15
The Costs-of-Sprawl Myth
It isn’t clear today just how much taxpay-
ers were actually subsidizing development in
Hamann’s San Jose. City property tax rates in
San Jose were higher than average, but not
the highest, in Santa Clara County.16 Tax
rates today are about the same, per thousand
dollars of property value, as they were in
Hamann’s time; but given that property val-
ues have increased far more than inflation,
the tax burden on homeowners today is far
greater than it was then.17
If there were subsidies—that is, if Hamann
really was using taxes from existing residents
to pay the capital costs of facilities needed for
new development—the appropriate remedy
would have been to make sure that develop-
ers paid the full costs of the services they
used. California developers often created spe-
cial improvement districts that allowed
homebuyers and other property owners to
pay the capital costs of water, sewer, and
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other facilities over a number of years. Such
districts ensured that these capital costs
would not reduce housing affordability by
increasing the cost of new, and by extension,
existing housing.
This tax issue reflects a larger issue raised by
a highly influential 1973 study titled The Costs
of Sprawl.18 Commissioned by the federal
Council on Environmental Quality, this study
claimed that low-density suburban develop-
ment imposed higher urban-service costs on
cities than higher-density developments. This
conclusion, however, had three weaknesses.
First, the study was based almost entirely
on hypothetical data. When a researcher at
Duke University looked at the real world to
compare urban-service costs in high- and
low-density areas, she found that higher den-
sities meant higher costs.19
Second, the study compared standard-
sized suburban homes in the low-density case
with smaller apartments in the high-density
case. Much of the difference in calculated
costs resulted from the greater square
footage of the suburban dwellings, not the
area of land being used for development.
Third, the study compared a low-density
“greenfield” development (that is, a develop-
ment on undeveloped property) with a high-
density greenfield project. However, the anti-
sprawl alternative was not high-density green-
field development but high-density infill devel-
opment within existing cities, which can be
much more expensive. As urban researchers at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
observed, “the cost of creating an additional
unit of sewage or water-carrying capacity may
be much higher than the unit cost of existing
capacity if the old sewage or water lines must
be dug up and replaced with larger ones.”20
Recently, researchers at Rutgers University
attempted to remedy the first two of these
weaknesses with an in-depth update titled The
Costs of Sprawl 2000. They concluded that low-
density suburban development imposes on
cities about $11,000 per home more in urban-
service costs than does more compact develop-
ment.21 If true, the way to deal with that, as in
the case of Hamann’s alleged subsidy, is to cre-
ate a special district and have the homeowners
pay the amortized costs over time.
In 2005, the median home in Santa Clara
County cost $797,000, which was 7.5 times
the median family income in the county. If
median home prices had been only 3.1 times
median family incomes, the national average
for that year, the median San Jose home
would have cost only $331,000.22 In an effort
to save new homebuyers $11,000 per home,
San Jose’s growth management was costing
all homebuyers an average of more than
$400,000 per home—hardly a sensible policy.
The Anti-Sprawl Movement
The tax question was only one of several
arguments put forth by no-growth advocates
who began to challenge Hamann’s policies in
the early 1960s. Most of their other argu-
ments centered on sprawl and its effects on
farmlands, recreation and natural areas, air
pollution, and traffic congestion. A 1971
book on the causes and effects of urban
sprawl in San Jose listed these negative effects
of sprawl: “for the tax-paying resident, ... his
taxes rise, his health suffers, his access to
nature is reduced, and his recreational oppor-
tunities are diminished.”23
In a sense, growth was its own undoing.
As one history book notes, “The very people
who had been brought to the city by growth
began to question that ethic.”24 In 1962, San
Jose voters elected a no-growth minority to
the San Jose city council. In 1969, that minor-
ity became a majority—and Hamann retired
rather than work with a council with which
he disagreed.
Over the next five years, this new city coun-
cil wrote a much stricter plan. It was not a no-
growth plan, but it was a no-sprawl plan. The
centerpiece of the plan was an urban-growth
boundary that specifically excluded from
development all of the hillsides to the east of
San Jose as being “too steep” to develop. In
addition, two large chunks of flat land recently
annexed by Hamann for future growth, Coyote
Valley and South Alameda Valley, were classed
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as “urban reserves.” These were off limits to
development until “the City’s fiscal condition
is stable, predictable and adequate” to finance
such new development.25
The 1974 plan presumed that the city could
control the rate of growth by limiting the
amount of land available for development and
the approval of building permits. The plan
considered four alternative rates of growth:
none (population stable at 643,000 people),
moderate (increase to 795,000 in 1990), high
(878,000), and maximum (1,036,000).26 The
plan picked the moderate growth alternative,
saying that the costs of more growth would be
too high and that “the densities required to
house the population within the valley floor
excluding Coyote would be appreciably higher
than current typical densities.”27
San Jose also rejected Hamann’s reserva-
tions about rail transit and jumped on the
light-rail bandwagon that had been started
by San Diego. Between 1984 and 2004, the
region built 35 miles of light-rail lines. Now
the city’s boosters are trying to find the $4.7
billion or more that will be needed to extend
a BART line to San Jose.
The Open Space Myth
Perhaps the most persuasive argument in the
anti-sprawler’s rhetorical toolbox is the notion
that urbanization threatens farms, forests, and
open spaces. Ballot measures that seek to
increase taxes to purchase parks and open
spaces tend to win easy approval from voters.28
Yet America’s farms, forests, and open
spaces are not at risk from urban sprawl. The
contiguous 48 states have about 920 million
acres of private agricultural lands, 400 million
acres of private forest lands, and another 400
million acres of federal lands, about half of
which are forested and much of the rest of
which qualify as range or agricultural lands.
Only about 110 million acres are developed,
and only about 70 million of those acres are
considered urban.29
Urbanization is “not considered a threat
to the nation’s food production,” says the
U.S. Department of Agriculture.30 One rea-
son is that the per-acre productivity of many
crops is growing faster than our population.
Between 1982 and 2006, the per-acre yields of
corn, cotton, rice, soybeans, potatoes, and
sugar beats all grew faster than our popula-
tion.31 This growth is not over: hydroponic
farming techniques can increase per-acre
yields by another eight times or more.32
Another reason urbanization does not
threaten farm production is that agricultural
lands are in many ways interchangeable. The
USDA divides American farmlands into
croplands (about 400 million acres, about 30
million acres of which are in conservation
reserves and not used for growing crops), pas-
turelands (about 120 million acres), and
rangelands (about 400 million acres).33 But
those definitions are somewhat artificial, and
most of the pasture and many of the range-
lands could be used for crops with irrigation
or other improvements.
Canadian urban planner Hans Blumenfeld
observed that many countries that are short on
land grow crops on land that the USDA would
not even classify as suitable for agriculture.
Japan and China terrace hillsides, for example,
and the Netherlands has reclaimed tidal flats.
It would be less expensive to transform “an acre
of class 3 or 4 farmland into class 1 or 2 by soil
improvement, drainage, or irrigation,” Blumen-
feld pointed out, than it would be to impose
higher housing costs on homebuyers.34
Forest productivity is similarly unthreat-
ened by urbanization. Even though the U.S.
population has nearly quadrupled since
1900, the efficiency with which wood prod-
ucts’ firms use wood has increased so much
that total timber consumption is about the
same now as then.35 Ironically, considering
that the automobile is blamed for sprawl, by
replacing the horse, the automobile allowed
landowners to restore more than 80 million
acres of forestlands that had once been
cleared for horse pasture.36
Rural open space is also abundant in every
American state. As of 1997, New Jersey, the
most developed state in the union, was more
than 60 percent rural open space. Connecticut
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was more than 70 percent rural, and every
other state was more than 80 percent rural
open space. On average, the United States was
more than 95 percent rural open space, while
California was 94.5 percent rural open space.37
Some regions might be short of urban open
space, but the San Francisco Bay Area is not
one of them. According to the Greenbelt
Alliance, which supports more land preserva-
tion, more than one million of the 4.5 million
acres in the nine-county Bay Area are preserved
as parks and reserves. By comparison, only
761,000 acres have been urbanized. Any other
urban area might be thrilled to have four acres
of parks for every three developed acres, but
this is not enough for the Alliance, which
argues that hundreds of thousands of acres—
mostly acres just outside of urban-growth
boundaries—are “at risk” of development.38
Using public resources to preserve open
space in a state and country that are 94–95 per-
cent open space is a tragic misplacement of pri-
orities. Preserving open space through public
funding and regulation discourages open-
space advocates from making any effort to tar-
get high priority lands because of their value
for wildlife, recreation, or other purposes.
Instead, they simply want it all. State and local
governments should get out of the business of
preserving additional open space and leave it to
nonprofit groups that will have the incentive
to focus their efforts on the lands that are truly
most valuable for open space.
Growth Management
As a result of land-use restrictions, which
have come to be called “growth management,”
the city of San Jose’s growth has steadily
declined since the 1960s (see Figure 1). In the
1990s, the annual growth of the city of San Jose
was less than half the growth in the 1960s, and
to date in the 2000s, it is less than a quarter of
its growth in the 1960s. This trend is just the
opposite of the growth of the high-tech indus-
try for which Silicon Valley is famous.
San Jose’s restrictions inhibited growth
throughout Santa Clara County. The cities to
the west and north of San Jose were either
land-locked by other cities or bordered by the
Santa Cruz Mountains to their west. As a
result, urban growth in Santa Clara County
declined from 42,000 people per year in the
1950s and 1960s to fewer than 8,000 people
per year so far in the 2000s.
Given the booming high-tech industry, slow-
ing San Jose’s population growth had to result
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Figure 1
Annual Population Growth
in increased land and housing prices, and it did.
According to the real estate company Coldwell
Banker, a standard four-bedroom, two-and-one-
half bath home in a “typical middle manage-
ment neighborhood” of relatively unregulated
Houston cost $155,000 in 2006. That same
home in San Jose cost more than $1.4 million.39
Contrary to Woody Guthrie’s song, San
Jose and other California cities have not always
been unaffordable. A standard measure of
housing affordability is price-to-income ratio,
that is, the price of a median home compared
with median family income. Census data show
that, in 1969, a median-priced San Jose home
cost about 2.2 times as much as San Jose’s
median family income. This was only a little
higher than the national price-to-income ratio
of 1.8, and it meant that a median San Jose
family devoting a quarter of the family’s
income to a mortgage could pay off the mort-
gage on a median home in just 12 years.40
By 1979, San Jose’s refusal to accommo-
date growth had sent housing prices shoot-
ing upward. The median home cost more
than 4.0 times median family income, com-
pared to a national average of 2.4 times.41
Given the high interest rates at the time, a
median family had to devote more than 40
percent of its income to a mortgage to pay off
a median home in 30 years. The situation
only worsened in later years, with price-to-
income ratios increasing to more than 5.0 by
1989 and more than 7.5 in 2005.42
How could prices rise so high? People
choose the regions they live in based more on
jobs, family, and friends than on housing
prices. This means the demand for new hous-
ing is “inelastic,” that is, a small restriction on
the supply of new homes will lead to a large
increase in prices. For example, one study esti-
mates that a 1.0 percent decline in the supply
of new homes can lead to a 2.5–3.0 percent
increase in prices.43 Because sellers of existing
homes gauge their homes’ value by the sale
prices of new homes, land-use policies that
increase the cost of new homes drive up the
price of all homes in a region.
A homebuilders’ study in 2002 estimated
the difference in costs between a new home
in San Jose and one in Dallas:
• The biggest difference was in land costs: A
7,000-square-foot lot in Dallas cost only
$29,000 while a mere 2,400-square-foot lot
in San Jose cost a whopping $232,000;
• San Jose’s lengthy permitting process (and
the high risk that a permit would never be
issued) meant San Jose developers needed
a $100,000 profit per home, more than 10
times the profit demanded by Dallas
developers;
•To help pay for roads, schools, and other
services, San Jose charged developers
$29,000 per new residence, while Dallas
charged only $5,000;
•Mainly because of high housing prices, San
Jose labor costs were higher: $143,000 for a
three-bedroom house compared with
$100,000 in Dallas.44
San Jose might have mitigated the high
land costs by allowing development in the
South Alameda and Coyote Valley urban
reserves, as contemplated in the 1974 plan. But
growth opponents have strenuously resisted
such development, which they claim would
lead to “increased gridlock, worsening air qual-
ity, and soaring home prices.” In 2001, former
San Jose Mayor Janet Gray Hayes, who was on
the city council when it adopted the 1974 plan,
called a plan to develop Coyote Valley “the Los
Angelization of San Jose.”45
The Los Angeles Myth
Anti-sprawl activists have long used Los
Angeles as a bogeyman. The Texas Transpor-
tation Institute says that Los Angeles is the
most congested urban area in America.46 The
Environmental Protection Agency says its air is
the most polluted.47 Planning advocates blame
these problems on Los Angeles’s low-density
sprawl and its extensive freeway network. “Los
Angeles is the granddaddy of sprawl,” says the
Sierra Club.48
San Jose sprawl opponents in the 1960s
loved to use A. P. Hamann’s own words against
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him: “They say San Jose is going to become
another Los Angeles,” he once said. “Believe me,
I’m going to do everything in my power to make
that come true.”49 Of course, Hamann saw Los
Angeles as a thriving economy, while his oppo-
nents considered it the epitome of sprawl.
Hamann’s critics were 100 percent wrong.
Los Angeles is actually the densest urban area in
America, and its congestion and pollution are a
direct result of that density, not of urban sprawl.
The Census Bureau defines “urbanized areas” as
“densely settled areas containing at least 50,000
people.”50 Each urbanized area generally con-
tains a central city and all adjacent developed
lands, including residential developments of at
least 1,000 people per square mile (about one
house for every two acres), whether or not they
are in incorporated cities. 
In 1970, when San Jose was first contem-
plating growth restrictions, its urban area
had about 3,700 people per square mile. The
Los Angeles urban area was much denser at
about 5,300 people per square mile and was
second only to New York’s 6,700 people per
square mile. But Los Angeles densities were
increasing, while the New York area densities
were declining as the region’s residents
sprawled into New Jersey and Connecticut.
By 1990, Los Angeles had reached 5,800 peo-
ple per square mile, and New York had
declined to just 5,400. San Jose’s density had
increased to 4,250 people per square mile.51
Between 1990 and 2000, the Census
Bureau improved its definition of “urban-
ized” to exclude vacant parcels of land near
urban fringes. This helped increase Los
Angeles’ density to 7,000 people per square
mile. Many other urban area densities also
increased, but New York’s declined to 5,300
people per square mile.52
Because they were inside the city limits,
the 1990 census included Coyote Valley and
South Alameda in the San Jose urbanized
area. These areas were excluded in 2000, and
this—combined with the region’s 14 percent
population increase—pushed San Jose’s den-
sity up to 5,900 people per square mile.53 This
made San Jose the third densest urban area in
America after Los Angeles and San Francisco-
Oakland. Though sprawl opponents claimed
they were saving San Jose from becoming like
Los Angeles, by excluding places like Coyote
Valley from development, they were in fact
making it more like Los Angeles than almost
any other region of the country.
The Los Angeles myth is wrong about trans-
portation too. As Burt Bacharach’s song sug-
gests, anyone who knows the way to San Jose
knows that, “LA is a great big freeway.”
However, Los Angeles actually has the fewest
miles of freeway per capita of any major urban
area in America. As of 2005, Los Angeles had
about 55 miles of freeway per million people,
compared with 78 for San Jose and an average
of 114 for all U.S. urban areas. All of the other
top-50 urban areas in the United States had
more miles per capita than Los Angeles.54
Los Angeles is congested because it packs
so many people into such a small area and
does not provide enough highways for them
to drive on. Los Angeles is polluted because
cars pollute more in congested traffic. Los
Angeles is also spending billions of dollars
building rail transit lines, which led the
NAACP to sue because the regional transit
agency was cutting low-cost bus service to
minority neighborhoods in order to bring
expensive rail service to white suburbs.55 As
will be shown below, San Jose’s transporta-
tion plans are emulating these less-than-
desirable features of Los Angeles.
Inhibitors to Growth
Silicon Valley workers might have gotten
some relief from high housing prices if near-
by cities and counties had not enacted simi-
lar growth-management rules. As it turned
out, every county in the Bay Area (except for
the entirely urban San Francisco County)
imposed some form of urban-growth bound-
aries in the 1970s. Today, enough San Jose
employees seeking affordable housing com-
mute from Stockton, some 80 miles away,
that San Joaquin, Alameda, and Santa Clara
counties began running commuter trains
between the two cities in 1998.56
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What would inspire so many California coun-
ties to enact growth-inhibiting rules in the 1970s?
A handful of institutions and laws peculiar to
California have combined to make the Golden
State the least affordable state in the nation.
First, in 1963 the California legislature
required every county in the state (except San
Francisco, whose boundary coincides with the
city of San Francisco) to create a local agency for-
mation commission (LAFCo). These commis-
sions are supposed to oversee the creation of
new cities and special districts, and the annexa-
tions of land into existing cities and districts. In
2000 the legislature added “preserve agricultur-
al lands” and “discourage urban sprawl” to the
LAFCos’ mandate. In fact, LAFCos had been dis-
couraging sprawl for many years before that.
In most states, cities and urban regions
grow when developers purchase vacant land,
usually near the urban fringe, and subdivide
it for housing or other development. If the
land is outside city limits, the developer may
help form a special service district to provide
sewer, water, and other services. While this
process has been demonized as “sprawl,” it
tends to provide a full range of affordable
housing stock and to meet the needs of local
residents because developers want to build
things that people want to buy.
The LAFCos short-circuited this process.
Most LAFCos comprise two members of each
city council in the county plus two members
of the county board of supervisors, so they
are heavily weighted toward the cities. Cities
have a powerful incentive to keep develop-
ment within their borders because that
boosts their tax base. They tend to resist the
incorporation of new cities and the forma-
tion of service districts outside their limits.
LAFCos gave cities the means to enforce
those desires.
Cities also compete with one another for
developments that can provide the greatest tax
revenues. In California, ever since voters
approved a property tax limitation measure
known as Proposition 13 in 1978, cities have
believed (not necessarily correctly) that residen-
tial areas represent a net drain on their finances
while retail developments pay more taxes than
they consume in municipal services.57 A bal-
ance of residential and retail developments
should pay its own way, but in places like the
San Francisco Bay Area, rival cities adopt “beg-
ger-thy-neighbor” policies aimed at attracting
retail developments while pushing new resi-
dential development onto adjacent cities. For
example, the city of Morgan Hill, which lies on
the southern border of San Jose, has a policy of
issuing no more than 250 building permits for
new homes each year.58
Cities in interior California tend to be
more isolated from one another than those
on the coast. Thus they are less likely to fear
that new residential developments will out-
weigh new retail developments in the same
jurisdiction. As a result, they place fewer
restrictions on residential development, and
interior California housing remains more
affordable than housing in the Bay Area and
Southern California (though it is still much
more expensive than in the rest of the United
States).
LAFCos were supposed to moderate this
rivalry by designating a “sphere of interest”
around each city so that lands within that
sphere could not be annexed by any other city.
Many LAFCos also designated urban-growth
boundaries, outside of which no major subdi-
visions would be allowed. In the case of San
Jose, the urban-growth boundary actually
excluded Coyote Valley and other land within
the city limits, prohibiting the city from devel-
oping those areas without permission from a
majority of other cities in the county. LAFCos
have also denied rural property owners the
right to incorporate their own city or service
district, thus denying them the right to develop
their property unless some other city was will-
ing to annex them.
LAFCos are not necessarily generous
about allowing cities to annex land—even
within their spheres of interest. Landlocked
cities see the annexation plans of other cities
as a competitive threat to their efforts to pro-
mote infill development and redevelopment
of blighted neighborhoods, so they tend to
oppose such expansions. The Santa Clara
County LAFCo, for example, has rejected
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requests from Gilroy, a town 35 miles south
of San Jose, to annex land.59
By the late 1970s, the LAFCos were clearly
inhibiting growth. A 1979 editorial cartoon
in the Thousand Oaks News Chronicle shows a
Napoleon-like man labeled “LAFCO” saying,
“As self-proclaimed Emperor, I outlaw new
development.” A reader responded with a
“rebuttal” cartoon showing a polluted
Thousand Oaks crowded with high-density
developments up to an urban-growth line
marked “Stopped by LAFCO.”60
Recently, the Santa Clara LAFCo adopted
an “agricultural mitigation policy” that
requires developers of farmland to pay a mit-
igation fee to be used to preserve farmland
elsewhere. The owner of 26 acres of farmland
near Gilroy estimates that the mitigation fee
would cost him $50,000 to $60,000 if he were
to develop the land—a cost that he would, of
course, pass on to the buyers of whatever
homes were built on the property.61
A second state law that inhibited growth is
the California Environmental Quality Act of
1970. This law requires state and local agencies
to write a detailed “environmental impact
report” for all “projects.” In 1976, a California
state court agreed that the mere act of annex-
ing land into a city was such a project.62
Ultimately, LAFCos and cities were required to
spend years writing such reports for any
change in the location of a sphere of influence,
urban-growth boundary, or city boundary.
It is unlikely that the lawmakers who voted
for CEQA had any idea just how far-reaching
this law would be. The law was written in imi-
tation of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, but no one in Congress knew in
1969, and no one in the California legislature
knew in 1970, just what a burden these laws
would place on government agencies. 
The third law inhibiting growth was a 1971
act requiring cities to ensure that their zoning
and other land-use decisions were consistent
with their comprehensive plans.63 The law cre-
ated grounds for members of the public to
challenge any land-use decision, thus stopping
or at least delaying the construction of new
homes and other developments. In effect, the
law entitled any resident of the state to a say in
how private property owners in the state could
use their land. The result was a major change in
attitudes toward property rights, which some
have called “the quiet revolution in land use
control.”64 “I understand personal property
rights,” says a Santa Clara County supervisor
who is also on the Santa Clara LAFCo, “but I
am also an environmentalist, and we can’t look
at land-use decisions only through the eyes of
the landowner.”65
This law had profound consequences for
housing. “Between 1972 and 1979 environ-
mental lawsuits [in the San Francisco Bay
Area] alone challenged developments con-
taining 29,000 new housing units, in an area
that normally builds only 45,000 units each
year,” reported Massachusetts Institute of
Technology planning professor Bernard
Frieden in 1979. “In the new political and
legal climate, stopping homebuilding soon
became easy—so easy that even a lone Boy
Scout doing an ecology project was able to
bring construction to a halt on a 200-unit
condominium project.”66
Local homeowners are more likely to chal-
lenge a nearby development of low-cost
homes (which they fear will reduce the value
of their own homes) than one of expensive
homes (which they hope will enhance their
property values). This leads developers, when
challenged, to alter plans—from many afford-
able homes to fewer expensive homes.
University of California planning professor
David Dowall tells of an Oakland developer
who proposed in 1971 to build 2,200 homes
that would sell for about $30,000 each but
ended up getting a permit in 1979 to build a
mere 150 homes for $200,000 each.67
A fourth institution that was first devel-
oped in California but now has spread to
most other states, is the redevelopment
agency, which can use eminent domain and
tax-increment financing to redevelop sup-
posedly blighted areas in cities. Other publi-
cations have thoroughly analyzed California
redevelopment agencies.68 What is relevant
here is that such agencies allow cities to cap-
ture property taxes that would otherwise go
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to schools and other services. This gives cities
one more incentive to promote redevelop-
ment rather than allow suburban develop-
ment at the urban fringes.
Together, LAFCos, CEQA, and the planning
law created numerous hurdles developers must
leap to satisfy the demand for new housing and
other developments. Even if a LAFCo permits a
city to annex land and the city or LAFCo pre-
pares the required environmental impact report,
an environmental group could go to court to
prevent the annexation on the grounds that the
state needed to preserve farmland.69
The environmentalists who bring such law-
suits are sometimes accused of crying “not in
my back yard” (NIMBY). Such accusations dis-
count their genuine interest in wildlife habitat,
watersheds, and other natural values. This
interest is often, but not always, misguided:
protecting habitat for an abundant species of
wildlife such as white-tailed deer is not the
same as protecting habitat for an endangered
species such as the California condor. The
problem is that the current system allows peo-
ple to challenge development projects and pro-
mote open-space preservation at such a low
cost to themselves that they have almost no
incentive to discriminate between serious and
trivial open-space needs.
LAFCos and the planning process also
give no weight to the interests of people who
will move to a region in the future. In 1973,
one urban planner projected that, within
15–20 years, 80 percent of the population of
many fast-growing urban areas in the West
“will consist of persons who are not yet there.
They have no vote, but it is their living condi-
tions which are determined now.” Yet, noted
the planner, no one “speaks for these voteless
people who are not yet here.”70 As a result,
LAFCos and other planning agencies tend to
discount future housing affordability in
favor of preserving municipal revenues.
All of these laws and institutions have
played a role in keeping Coyote Valley closed
to development for more than 30 years after
San Jose included it in its urban reserve. 
• First, San Jose and the Santa Clara
LAFCo had to agree in principle that
Coyote Valley could be brought within
the city’s urban-growth boundary, some-
thing that did not happen until 2002.71
• Second, the city had to write an envi-
ronmental impact report, a process
that only reached the draft stage in
2007.72 Some idea of the complexity of
this process can be gained by noting
that the draft report is 541 pages long
and accompanied by two similar-sized
appendices. As of mid-2006, Coyote
Valley property owners had spent $13
million preparing this report.73
• Third, the Sierra Club and other environ-
mental groups have suggested that they
will challenge the plan unless developers
donate $100 million to purchase land for
preservation elsewhere as mitigation.74
If it takes this much trouble to develop land
that has been inside the San Jose city limits for
nearly 40 years, think how difficult it would be
to develop land outside the city limits! The cur-
rent plan to develop the first 3,783 acres of
Coyote Valley proposes to use only 1,600 of
those acres for residences and another 600 acres
for commercial and industrial purposes, leaving
much of the rest in permanent open space.75 So
even when the planning is done, it will do very
little to relieve San Jose’s housing crisis.
Thanks to this complicated planning and
approval process, California is the most
intensely urbanized state in the nation. The
2000 Census found that 94.4 percent of
Californians live on just 5.1 percent of the land
in the state. No other state has managed to
pack such a high percentage of its people into
such a small proportion of its land area. The
average population density in California urban
areas was more than 4,000 people per square
mile, making it second only to New York
(which is skewed by New York City’s density of
26,000 people per square mile).76 By compari-
son, the average density of all U.S. urban areas
was only 2,400 people per square mile.77
LAFCos, CEQA, and other planning laws
have ensured that San Jose’s housing affordabil-
ity problems are replicated throughout
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California. In 2005, the state’s most affordable
urban area—Bakersfield—had a price-to-income
ratio of 4.2, making it less affordable than 90
percent of U.S. urban areas outside of California.
If housing in regions with growth man-
agement had price-to-income ratios that
were only 25 percent more than the national
average, California homebuyers would have
saved $136 billion on homes purchased in
2005. If ratios had been equal to the national
average, homebuyers would have saved $170
billion.78 In Santa Clara County alone the
cost of growth management to 2005 home-
buyers was $10.1–12.6 billion.
Of course, San Jose did not sit idly by
while housing became unaffordable for most
of its residents. In 2006, the San Jose
Housing Department spent $1.3 million to
“increase affordable housing supply.”79 That
is slightly more than 0.1 percent of the bur-
den San Jose’s land-use policies have placed
on the region’s homebuyers. San Jose and
other Santa Clara County cities have also
adopted “inclusionary zoning” policies that
require developers to sell a certain percentage
of new homes at below-market prices to low-
and moderate-income families. But as econo-
mists at San Jose State University have
shown, inclusionary zoning actually reduces
housing affordability by reducing the supply
of housing and forcing developers to pass on
the costs of below-market sales to purchasers
of the remaining homes they build.80
California cities could have kept housing
affordable by allowing people to settle at the
average U.S. urban density, in which case they
would have occupied 8.5 percent of the state
instead of 5.1 percent.81 LAFCos, CEQA, and
other planning laws saved 3.4 percent of the
state from development at a cost to home-
buyers of $136–170 billion per year. It was
those institutions and laws that made
California housing unaffordable.
The Homevoter Hypothesis
The “homevoter hypothesis” suggests
that, since most homeowners have most of
their assets in the value of their home, their
votes and politics will be largely shaped by
actions that might increase or reduce that
home value.82 The majority of households
did not own their own homes until around
1950, so “homevoters” did not dominate pol-
itics until the second half of the 20th centu-
ry.83 Now that they are in the majority, they
use land-use policies to effectively create a
cartel, limiting new development in order to
drive up home prices and obtain windfall
profits for themselves at the expense of new-
comers and first-time homebuyers. 
However, the “homevoter hypothesis”
does not explain why some U.S. cities enact-
ed growth-inhibiting policies and others,
such as Houston, Las Vegas, and Phoenix, did
not. A close examination of San Jose and
nearby cities reveals that the “homevoter
hypothesis” is oversimplified for two reasons.
First, it ignores the role of city governments,
which actually make more decisions about
future growth than voters and which are
more motivated by tax revenues than hous-
ing prices. Second, it ignores the fact that
California is one of the few states whose laws
give residents a say in how all other property
owners in the state use their land. Without
this legal entitlement, few homeowners
would worry about how distant property
owners use their land.
Other reasons suggest that the “homevoter
hypothesis” is not the sole, or even the major,
factor behind California’s affordability crisis.
For example, the benefits to homeowners of
rising prices are ambiguous. High housing
prices are as much of an impediment to home-
owners who want to upgrade to a larger home
as they are to first-time homebuyers. Because
of realtor fees and other transaction costs, high
prices can even be an impediment to home-
owners who want to move to a smaller home.
High housing prices thus limit the mobility for
which Americans are famed.
In Great Britain, whose housing prices have
been artificially inflated by growth-manage-
ment planning since 1947, an economist has
found that neighborhoods with high home-
ownership rates have higher unemployment
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rates than neighborhoods with high rental
rates.84 When housing becomes unaffordable,
the cost of moving becomes greater than the
benefits of finding a new job.
Research in both Britain and the United
States shows that planning-induced housing
shortages not only increase home prices, they
make them more volatile. If small restrictions
in supply can push prices sky-high, small
reductions in demand, such as occur during
a recession, can cause prices to plummet.
“By ignoring the role of supply in determin-
ing house prices,” says an analysis of British plan-
ning, “planners have created a system that has
led not only to higher house prices but also to a
highly volatile housing market.”85 Harvard econ-
omist Edward Glaeser agrees that land-use rules
that restrict “housing supply lead to greater
volatility in housing prices.” Glaeser found that
“if an area has a $10,000 increase in housing
prices during one period, relative to national and
regional trends, that area will lose $3,300 in
housing value over the next five-year period.”86
San Jose has seen just such volatility in its
housing market in the past 30 years. Between
1981 and 1983, inflation-adjusted housing
prices fell by 8 percent. Between 1989 and 1995,
they fell by 20 percent. Prices peaked again in
2006 and are once again falling.87 Since home-
owners rarely know exactly when they may
decide to sell their home, a cautious homebuyer
would prefer prices to be less volatile.
Between 2001 and 2004, San Jose suffered a
disastrous recession. Employment declined by
17 percent and office vacancy rates climbed
from 3 to nearly 30 percent. Yet housing prices
grew nearly 14 percent during those years, and
managed to grow another 21 percent in 2005.88
As a result, prices today are completely discon-
nected from “fundamentals” (which, for hous-
ing, means rental prices), and mortgage insurer
PMI estimates that there is a 50 percent proba-
bility that San Jose prices will be lower two years
from now than they are today.89
High housing prices also discourage
employers from expanding or building new
facilities in a region, which in turn makes
jobs more volatile. Harvard’s Glaeser also
found that “places with rapid price increases
over one five-year period are more likely to
have income and employment declines over
the next five-year period.”90 This increases the
risk that people who buy homes when prices
are high may lose their jobs in the next reces-
sion and be forced to sell at a loss, or declare
bankruptcy, when they cannot sell their
home for an amount greater than their
remaining mortgage on the house.
Of course, it might be argued that home-
owners don’t know that planning-induced
housing shortages make prices and employ-
ment more volatile. But many homeowners
are just as unaware that local government
decisions about annexations and open-space
preservation have increased housing prices.
Most urban planners and planning advo-
cates insist that high housing prices result
solely from demand, not supply. 
For example, Paul Danish is a former
Boulder city councilor who so strongly advocat-
ed limits on building permits and open-space
purchases that these policies are known in
Boulder as “the Danish plan.” Boulder has the
least-affordable housing of any noncoastal,
urban area in the United States. But according
to Danish, Boulder prices are high solely
because his policies have made it “a really desir-
able place to live.” Any place that is more afford-
able—which includes 90 percent of the urban
areas in the United States—must be, according
to Danish, “a really awful place to live.”91
Informed by such “experts,” people who get
involved in planning may be blissfully unaware
that their actions are increasing their housing
prices. Thus, they may be motivated as much
or more by other concerns, such as traffic con-
gestion, wildlife habitat, and taxes, as by home
values. While the “homevoting” phenomenon
has played a role in California’s housing crisis,
the real key has been the institutional and legal
design of California’s planning and permitting
process.
Transportation Planning
After housing affordability, congestion is the
most important urban problem in California.
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The Texas Transportation Institute’s annual
report on urban mobility has consistently
ranked Los Angeles and the San Francisco-
Oakland regions as the nation’s two most con-
gested urban areas (measured by hours of delay
per traveler).92 California congestion wastes
close to 600 million gallons of gasoline and
costs commuters more than $16 billion per year,
not counting the cost to businesses that depend
on timely deliveries of freight and materials.93
Even as San Jose land-use planners were
making their region one of the least affordable
housing markets in America, its transporta-
tion planners were building the framework for
what would become the worst-managed tran-
sit system in the nation. In its zeal to get people
out of their cars, San Jose’s transit board built
an expensive rail system that it couldn’t afford
to run. This resulted in a scathing grand jury
investigation, an even more scathing report
from an outside auditor, and the resignation of
several top agency managers. Yet the board is
determined to build still more rail lines it can’t
afford to operate.
Today’s modern urban planners firmly
believe that there is a link between trans-
portation and land use. To comprehend the
San Jose’s transit disaster, it is useful to
understand the history of that linkage.
American cities were built in three major
eras. First was the pedestrian era, during
which most people walked to work and other
destinations. That required high-density
housing and a mingling of housing with
retail shops, offices, and factories. 
The pedestrian era began to end when
“horse cars” were developed. Those first
appeared in San Jose in about 1868.94 But
horse cars were slow and expensive, so the
pedestrian era really did not end until about
1890, when the technology for the electric
streetcar was fully developed. San Jose’s first
successful electric streetcars began operation
in that year.95
The streetcar era lasted from about 1890 to
1930, when the combined effects of the
Depression and the automobile forced most
streetcar companies to curtail services. Yet
streetcar lines had never been highly profitable.
Instead, most were built to connect suburban
real-estate development with city centers. The
profits from the sale of homes paid the capital
costs of the streetcars. Passenger fares paid the
operating costs—and only did so as long as
downtown remained a dense job center and
the streetcars did not have a lot of competition
from the automobile.
Streetcar cities thus were more sprawling
than pedestrian cities because the streetcar
allowed more people to reach neighborhoods
of single-family homes. Yet these neighbor-
hoods were still fairly dense because, once off
the streetcar, residents still had to walk
home. In most cities, neighborhoods of older
homes on 50-by-100-foot lots laid out on
gridded streets are streetcar suburbs (though
often annexed into the city by now).
The streetcar era also saw the decentral-
ization of jobs. Instead of being “monocen-
tric,” with all jobs located downtown, cities
and urban areas became “polycentric,” with
many jobs located in neighborhood and sub-
urban centers that formed around the street-
car network.
While the Depression ended the streetcar
era, the automobile era did not really begin
until after World War II, when more people
had the incomes to buy both cars and homes.
Homeownership rates quickly rose from less
than 45 percent in 1940 to more than 60 per-
cent in 1960.96 Prior to 1945, most home-
owners were white-collar workers; the auto-
mobile era brought homeownership to the
working class. (It is a sad commentary on
American society that, as historians Robert
Bruegmann and Peter Hall both observe, the
sprawl debate is partly motivated by people
with middle-class attitudes resentful when
working-class families attain the success
once reserved for the upper classes.97)
Densities in automobile cities are lower
than in streetcar cities. Lot sizes of 7,000 (70-
by-100 feet) to 10,000 square feet (100-by-
100 feet, approximately a quarter of an acre)
became common in the 1950s and 1960s.
However, it is important to understand that
one reason densities are lower today than a
few decades ago is that household sizes are
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smaller, but each household typically occu-
pies the same size lot.
Jobs in automobile cities are even more
decentralized than in streetcar cities. Urban
economist William Bogart estimates that
only 30–40 percent of the jobs in today’s
automobile cities can be found in down-
towns or other regional and suburban cen-
ters.98 The majority of the jobs are distrib-
uted across the cityscape almost as finely as
the residents themselves.
Pedestrian cities have very high densities
at their core with densities sharply declining
toward the fringe; streetcar cities have mod-
erately high densities at their core with densi-
ties slowly declining toward the fringe. In
contrast, automobile regions tend to have
about the same densities in the center and in
the suburbs.
This history explains a lot about why tran-
sit works in some cities and not in others. A
few American urban areas, notably Boston,
Chicago, New York, San Francisco, and
Washington, still have some remnants of the
pedestrian cities at their core. Though it
requires heavy subsidies, transit carries a sig-
nificant amount of travel in these regions. In
New York, transit takes 30 percent of all com-
muters to work, while in the other four
regions, transit carries 12–16 percent of com-
muters.99 The key is to have lots of jobs where
the transit system meets the hub.
Far more urban areas, such as Denver,
Portland, and Seattle, consist of a core rem-
nant streetcar city and automobile-oriented
suburbs. Actually, the classic streetcar city is
Los Angeles, which grew from 50,000 people in
1890 to more than 1.2 million people in 1930
and which still has a very dense core. In regions
that still have significant streetcar cities at their
core, including Los Angeles, transit carries
about 4–10 percent of commuters to work.
Transit does not do better than this because
jobs are so decentralized that most workers do
not find transit a feasible choice.
Some former streetcar cities, such as St.
Louis, lost their dense cores as people fled the
cities for the suburbs. The population of the city
of St. Louis declined by about 50 percent after
1950 even as its urban area continued to grow.
Transit in such regions does not carry more
than 3 or 4 percent of commuters to work.
Transit is even less effective in regions that
grew largely after 1950. This includes most
Sunbelt cities, whose growth required the
development of air conditioning. It also
includes San Jose, whose population grew
from 93,000 people in 1950 to 930,000 peo-
ple today. Transit in these regions typically
takes 1–4 percent of commuters to work.
Some people believe that transit can be
made more effective by increasing population
densities. But the real key is job density. When
jobs are finely spread out across the region,
transit is ineffective because too many people
either live or work in an area that is not well
served by transit.
San Jose is a classic automobile region: 90
percent was built after 1950; only a small per-
centage of the region’s jobs are in downtown
San Jose; and suburban densities are actually
greater than the city center’s. Thus, no matter
how much is spent on transit, it is not likely
to ever carry more than about 4 or 5 percent
of commuters. As of 2005, it carried about
3.3 percent.100
In such a situation, the goal for a transit
agency should be to provide cost-effective
service for transit-dependent people as well
as those who prefer not to drive. This virtual-
ly always means bus service, as rail service
costs far more to build and often costs more
to operate than buses.
San Jose’s streetcars stopped operating in
1938.101 For the next 35 years, three different
companies offered bus services. A county transit
district took over those bus services in 1973.
Initially, the district experimented with a “dial-a-
ride” system of small buses that would move
people from door to door. But this actually
proved to be too successful, overwhelming the
call center that dispatched the buses. The system
also incurred the wrath of local taxi companies
that considered it an infringement on their fran-
chises; they persuaded a judge that the transit
district should either shut down the dial-a-ride
system or buy them out.102 So San Jose aban-
doned the dial-a-ride system and concentrated
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on fixed-route buses. With the help of a one-
half-cent permanent sales tax for transit opera-
tions approved by voters in 1976, the fixed-route
bus system proved to be popular, with ridership
doubling between 1978 and 1981.103
After 1981, however, San Jose succumbed to
the siren song of streetcars as sung by San
Diego. In that year, San Diego opened the
nation’s first light-rail line—light rail being a
cross between a streetcar and a heavy-duty inter-
city electric rail line. Streetcars typically run
exclusively on streets mingled with cars and
pedestrians; subways and elevated lines like
BART run exclusively on their own rights-of-
way; most light-rail lines run on a combination
of city streets and exclusive rights-of-way. The
“light” in light rail refers not to the weight of the
rails but to the loads: because light rail typically
operates one-, two-, or three-car trains, it cannot
carry as many people as BART or other subways
that can run eight-car trains or more.
San Diego’s first light-rail line had a double
advantage. It was built at a low cost, partly
because it used the right-of-way of an aban-
doned freight rail line. The final cost was about
$7 million per mile (about $15 million in
today’s dollars); no U.S. light-rail line since has
been built for such a low cost. In addition, it
extended from downtown San Diego to San
Ysidro, at the border with Tijuana. It thus car-
ried lots of tourists to Tijuana and lots of
Mexican workers who commuted to U.S. jobs
and did not want the expense or hassle of
bringing cars across the border every day.
After San Diego’s light-rail line opened, the
Santa Clara County Transit District resolved to
build its own light-rail line. A 1983 environ-
mental impact statement found that a
“busway” would cost less to build and would
attract more riders than light rail. However, it
also estimated that light rail would cost less to
operate than buses. A large share of the capital
costs of light rail would be covered by federal
and state grants, but the state, at least, would
not provide funds to build a busway. “Since the
[operating] subsidies needed to supplement
fares are paid out of local tax resources,” said
the document, this difference in operating
costs tilted the decision toward rail.104
San Jose transit ridership stagnated in the
mid-1980s as the transit agency focused on
planning and building its first rail line.
Opening in 1988, this first line and later expan-
sions each provided a boost in ridership—but
no sustained growth. Between 1988 and 2001,
total transit ridership increased by less than 4
percent per year—paltry compared with the 26
percent annual growth achieved in 1978
through 1981, when the transit district
focused on providing fixed-route bus service.
Moreover, by 2001, when the region had
opened 29 miles of light-rail routes, light rail
still carried less than 16 percent of the region’s
transit riders.105
As in 1938, when San Jose’s last streetcars
stopped running, the chief competition for
light rail was not buses but autos. During
and after the Hamann era, the state built a
network of freeways and expressways within
San Jose and connecting the region with
other parts of the Bay Area.
• The Bayshore Freeway (U.S. 101), the
Santa Cruz Freeway (SR 17), and the
Nimitz Freeway (I-880) were all built
during the Hamann era;
• Although a 1960s “Freeway Revolt”
stopped construction of several free-
ways in San Francisco, California con-
tinued to build I-280 and I-680 in the
south Bay Area, completing them in
the early 1970s;
• In 1984, Santa Clara County voters
agreed to a 10-year, one-half-cent sales
tax for new roads, which was used to,
among other things, build a freeway on
state route 85, expand SR-87 and SR-
237 parkways into freeways, and add
lanes to U.S. 101 and I-880.106 Most of
these routes were completed in the mid
1990s, but SR-87, the Guadalupe
Freeway, was not completed until 2004.
These freeways do an enormous amount of
work in the region. Although they comprise
only 3 percent of the roadway miles in the San
Jose urban area, they carry 45 percent of vehicle
traffic.107 Detailed data are not available before
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1982, but the freeway expansions funded by
the 1984 sales tax actually allowed the arterial
network to grow faster than traffic between
1989 and 1997.108 During this time, the region
gained more than 110,000 new jobs.109 Yet the
traffic delays faced by the average peak-period
commuter fell by 50 percent.110
In contrast, transit plays an insignificant role
in the region’s transportation system. The 2000
Census found that transit carried about 3.6 per-
cent of commuters in the San Jose urban area.111
U.S. Department of Transportation data indi-
cate that transit carried only 1 percent of the
region’s total passenger travel, with light rail car-
rying about 15 percent of transit riders.112
Despite those numbers, planners are now
directing most of the region’s transportation
resources to transit rather than highways. In
1995, the Santa Clara County Transit District
merged with the Santa Clara Congestion
Management Agency to form the Santa Clara
Valley Transportation Authority, or VTA for
short. VTA not only ran the transit system but
planned transportation for the entire region.
This created a conflict of interest: any money
VTA planned to spend on transit would go to
VTA, but money it planned to spend on high-
ways would go to some other agency.
Not surprisingly, VTA immediately called
for more spending on transit than highways.
When the time came to extend the 1984 one-
half-cent sales tax for highways for another
10 years, VTA persuaded the county to
include two light-rail projects and several
other transit projects in the program. Voters
approved the plan in 1996.113
Then, in 2000, VTA published a 20-year
transportation plan for the region that called
for spending more than four times as much
on rail transit improvements as on freeway
and expressway expansions: $7.30 billion vs.
$1.56 billion, including $3.8 billion for an
extension of BART from Fremont (south of
Oakland) to San Jose.114 That $7.3 billion,
VTA promised, would relieve congestion by
increasing transit’s share of commuting
from 4.2 to 7.5 percent, an increase of 3.3 per-
cent, and transit’s share of total travel from
3.2 to 4.3 percent.115
To fund this plan, VTA persuaded voters to
extend the one-half-cent sales tax for another
30 years and to dedicate all of it to transit.116
VTA sold this to voters by promising it would
reduce congestion by 19 percent.117 But nearly
all of this relief comes from the $1.56 billion
worth of highway improvements in VTA’s
plan—not one dollar of which would be fund-
ed out of the sales tax. Instead, sales tax rev-
enues were dedicated to $6.0 billion of the $7.3
billion rail transit program. VTA’s plan pro-
jected that these transit improvements would
persuade barely 4 percent of auto commuters
to switch to transit.118 Even though highways
carried well over 90 percent of passenger and
freight travel within Santa Clara County, VTA
had successfully captured for transit all of the
local funding voters had approved for high-
ways in 1984.
VTA was soon flooded with capital funds.
In 1997, its capital budget was $57 million,
only 14 percent of which came from local
sources.119 By 2003, it had a capital budget of
$457 million, 72 percent of which supposed-
ly came out of the local sales tax.120 (In fact,
much of this money did not come directly
from the sales taxes but from the more than
$400 million worth of sales-tax-backed
bonds issued by VTA.121) 
Yet VTA’s light-rail lines were not performing
well even by the low standard set by the nation’s
other light-rail systems. In 2001, each route mile
of VTA light rail carried an average of just under
4,000 passenger miles per day (about 20 percent
of an average freeway lane mile in San Jose); the
national average was more than 8,800. At any
given time in 2001, the average VTA light-rail car
carried 15.2 riders in revenue service; the nation-
al average was 27.2. The only light-rail line that
performed more poorly was New Jersey’s
Hudson-Bergen line.122
Things only got worse after 2001, which
turned out to be the high-water mark for VTA.
Between 2000 and 2004, the “dot-com-bust” led
to a 15-percent decline in employment in Santa
Clara County.123 (Employment numbers are for
calendar years; VTA numbers are for July-to-
June fiscal years.) This reduced both ridership
and sales tax revenues, including the revenues
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for operating expenses. The effects of the bust
on VTA’s capital program were small, as most
VTA funding came from bond sales. But the
effects on operations were significant. In a two-
year period, local sales taxes for operations
declined from $173 million to just $106 million.
That drop forced VTA to cut back both
bus and light-rail service. Between 2001 and
2005, vehicle-revenue miles of bus service
declined by 19 percent and light-rail service
declined by 12 percent despite a 21 percent
increase in rail route miles. In the same peri-
od, total ridership fell by 34 percent.124 Since
jobs declined by only 15 percent, much if not
most of the reduced ridership resulted from
the service cuts.
VTA was forced to take other desperate steps
to keep its vehicles rolling. In 2002, it sold some
land that it had intended to use as a park-and-
ride station or transit-oriented development.
“VTA is completely illiquid,” said a member of
the VTA board of directors. “They sold that
piece of property to make payroll.”125
In 2003, VTA took the unusual step of fund-
ing much of its operations out of proceeds from
bonds that were dedicated to capital improve-
ments. This led to a grand jury investigation that
charged VTA’s board with “over-promising of
programs to voters; inefficient timing of expendi-
tures; financial forecasts designed to support pro-
gram plans rather than evaluate options (and as a
consequence not identifying more optimal
approaches); and decisions influenced by benefits
to local districts rather than to the regional Santa
Clara County transportation system.”126
VTA “cannot afford the cost to build and
operate a BART system to San Jose,” the grand
jury found.127 Yet VTA’s board seemed intent
on building one anyway, and continued to
build light-rail lines even though it did not
have the money to operate them. The grand
jury blamed the board’s structure for the prob-
lems: the board comprises 2 county supervi-
sors and 10 commissioners from various cities
in the county. Most serve only one two-year
term, so few become intimately familiar with
the details of VTA operations or finances.
VTA’s light-rail performance significantly
deteriorated after 2001; by 2004, the average
light-rail car carried only 13 passengers, and
the average mile of light-rail line carried less
than 2,300 passenger miles per day, making
San Jose’s light rail even worse than New
Jersey’s Hudson-Bergen line.
Most public attention was focused on the
proposed BART line. Unlike VTA’s ground-
level light-rail lines, BART is a combination
of elevated and subway lines. An elevated rail
line typically costs about twice as much to
build as a ground-level light-rail line; a sub-
way (which VTA proposed to build within
San Jose’s city limits) is several times more
expensive still. Although BART trains are run
by the BART district, VTA would be respon-
sible for the cost of both building and oper-
ating BART trains in Santa Clara County.
An environmental impact report for the
proposed BART line found that it would have
virtually no effect on congestion on any of the
highways in the San Jose area. The report eval-
uated 96 different freeway segments in the
region and estimated that those freeways
would carry an average of about 10,000 cars
per hour during peak hours in 2030. The pro-
posed BART line would take an average of 59
cars per hour off those freeways. The report
estimated average peak-hour speeds with and
without BART to the nearest mile per hour; it
found that BART would not increase freeway
speeds by even 1 mile per hour on any of the 96
segments studied.128
Meanwhile, the $3.8 billion capital cost
projected by VTA in 2000 had increased to
$4.7 billion by 2006. That meant the existing
sales tax was insufficient to build it. In June
2006, VTA asked voters for another quarter-
cent sales tax, but voters rejected the request.
In late 2006, the VTA board had an oppor-
tunity to kill the BART line: it needed to
approve $185 million to continue planning
the line. Even if the agency had the money to
build it, VTA’s general manager warned, “we
clearly do not have the money to operate
it.”129 But the board approved it anyway.
Either out of frustration with the board or
because of incompetence, a succession of
managers left VTA between 2004 and 2007.
The agency’s chief financial officer resigned
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to accept a lower-paying job elsewhere about
the time of the grand jury report.130 VTA’s
general manager left in 2006. The new gener-
al manager hired an outside auditor to review
the agency’s finances. The auditor’s report
prompted the resignation of the agency’s
new chief financial officer.
Yet, like the grand jury report, the audit was
more critical of the board than of manage-
ment. “Many of the Board’s actions over the
last decade have not supported VTA’s core
business or its mission,” the auditor conclud-
ed. “The Board has approved capital projects
that were political solutions to address the
needs of certain local neighborhoods at the
expense of regional congestion management.
As a result, VTA has built transportation sys-
tems that have low ridership and are also
expensive to operate and maintain.”131
Yet the board is unrepentant and is
expected to come back to the voters with
another sales tax increase in 2008. Voters will
no doubt be impressed by the board’s
response to the chief financial officer’s resig-
nation: to replace him, it hired a mining com-
pany executive with no previous experience
in the transit industry, paying him $13,600
per week, more than three times as much as
it had paid the person he replaced.132
The Congestion Myths
The case for spending money on transit
rather than highways comes down to two
myths about congestion: first, you can’t build
your way out of congestion; and second, para-
doxically, rail transit can reduce congestion.
The first myth was disproven by San Jose’s
experience in the early 1990s, when highway
expansions reduced the total amount of time
wasted by each rush-hour commuter from 100
to 50 hours per year.133 Yet many people still
believe this myth and its corollary, that new
highways merely induce new traffic. 
Much of what some people have called
induced demand when new highways open is
really just traffic rerouted from other roads
and streets. Between 1982 and 2003, America’s
major urban areas added anywhere from 2 per-
cent (Toledo) to 535 percent (Phoenix) new
lane miles to their freeway systems. If new lane
miles induced more driving, we would expect
to see a strong correlation between the growth
in lane miles and the growth in total driving. In
fact, we do find a strong correlation between
the growth in lane miles and the growth of
freeway driving—0.84—but the correlation
between new lane miles and total driving is
much weaker: 0.52.134
As University of California planning profes-
sor Robert Cervero observes, much of the latter
correlation may be due to an “induced invest-
ment” effect: that is, that increased driving
leads to more road construction rather than
the other way around. The induced-demand
myth, Cervero admits, has caused enormous
harm. “Claims of induced demand have
stopped highway projects in their tracks,” say
Cervero. “This is wrongheaded. . . . The prob-
lems people associate with roads—e.g., conges-
tion and air pollution—are not the fault of the
road investments,” he adds. They result “from
the use and mispricing of roads.”135 In other
words, to the extent that there is induced
demand, the solution is not to stop building
roads but to use “congestion pricing,” that is,
tolls that vary according to the amount of traf-
fic on the road.
The other myth—that rail transit can
reduce congestion—is just as pernicious. As
the satirical newspaper The Onion notes, “98
percent of U.S. commuters favor public
transportation for others.”136 Many people
support rail transit because they hope it will
allow them to drive on uncongested roads. In
fact, outside of New York City, U.S. transit
systems carry so few commuters that even if
rail transit doubled transit commuting, peo-
ple on the road would not notice any differ-
ence. For example, Denver is currently plan-
ning six new rail lines stretching 119 miles
and costing at least $5 billion. The region’s
planners estimate that these rail lines will
take just 1.4 percent of rush-hour traffic off
the region’s highways.137
Some rail advocates will point out that this
1.4 percent is a reduction in congestion, but it
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is certainly not cost-effective when compared
with highways, buses, or other alternatives.
When Denver planners hired an outside con-
sultant to review the plan to build a rail line to
the Denver airport, the consultant found that
rails would cost 60 percent more and provide
just half as much congestion relief as new high-
way lanes or high-occupancy-vehicle lanes with
improved bus service.138
The San Francisco Bay Area Metropolitan
Transportation Commission reached similar
conclusions in an evaluation of its Transporta-
tion Blueprint for the 21st Century. The evaluation
compared the cost and the number of hours of
congestion delay that would be relieved by
more than 100 different highway, bus, ferry,
and rail projects. Of the 68 transit projects, 21
of the 25 most cost-effective were bus projects,
while 22 of the least cost-effective were rail and
ferry projects. To attract one person out of his
or her car onto transit for one trip, the evalua-
tion found, would cost $1–12 for the 25 most
cost-effective projects. The cost of attracting a
new rider onto a BART extension to San Jose,
however, would be more than $100.139
Even many rail advocates admit that rail’s
effects on congestion are minor, but they don’t
want the public to know that. In a typical pre-
sentation, they point out that a region’s popu-
lation and traffic are expected to grow by some
large amounts in the next few decades, and
something must be done to accommodate that
growth. If they are honest, they won’t actually
say that rail transit will reduce congestion, only
that it will give people a “choice”—although,
for most people, the choice will be between sit-
ting in traffic or taking a train that doesn’t
start where they are and doesn’t go where they
want to go.
Because of the high cost and low benefits
of extending BART to San Jose, many Bay
Area transit advocacy groups have come out
against the project, including the BayRail
Alliance,140 the Transportation Choices
Forum,141 the Transportation and Land Use
Coalition,142 and the San Francisco Chapter
of the Sierra Club.143 These groups agree that
it would take resources away from more
effective, lower-cost transit services. 
VTA’s light-rail lines, while more cost-
effective than BART, are still far less cost-
effective than improving bus service or
expanding highways. A proposed rail connec-
tion to the San Jose Airport, for example, was
projected by the Metropolitan Transpor-
tation Commission to cost $65 per new rider,
while building light rail to Fremont instead
of a BART line was projected to cost $22 per
new rider.144 (No other Santa Clara light-rail
lines were evaluated in the Blueprint.)
Recommendations
Even more than most other California
urban areas, San Jose is in serious trouble. The
region’s economy took a nosedive in recent
years, not just because of the dot-com bust, but
because high-tech employers are locating their
offices and plants in other regions where their
employees can afford housing. Although the
San Jose area is beginning to recover, as of May
2007 it still had 40,000 fewer jobs than in
1999.145 Unless San Jose can fix its affordabili-
ty crisis, its economy will continue to follow a
boom-and-bust pattern that is potentially
harmful to everyone in the region.
Thanks to recent highway improvements,
the region’s transportation network is in bet-
ter shape than most major U.S. urban areas.
But the future looks dim as VTA has success-
fully captured most of the region’s trans-
portation dollars and plans to spend them
on projects that will do little to improve
mobility or relieve congestion.
The fundamental problem is the planning
process mandated by the state. Despite
claims of being comprehensive, this planning
process is biased toward the interests of the
city governments over the interests of the res-
idents in those cities and property owners
outside the cities. Despite claims that it looks
toward the future, the process is biased in
favor of existing residents against the inter-
ests of future residents. Despite claims of
efficiency, the process is biased toward polit-
ical pork barrel (such as a BART line to San
Jose) over cost-effectiveness. Despite plan-
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ners’ image of promoting social justice, plan-
ning imposes highly regressive policies that
hurt low-income people the most.
The alternative to planning is to let the
free market work, which means letting peo-
ple make their own choices about where they
live, how they use their property, and how
they travel around. It also means ensuring
that people pay the full cost of their choices.
Such a transformation will require action
by the California legislature, Santa Clara
County board of supervisors, San Jose and
other city councils, and the VTA board. They
should:
1. Stop trying to stop sprawl—Most of
the costs associated with sprawl are either
imaginary or are better addressed directly
rather than indirectly through growth-man-
agement planning and land-use regulation.
California should repeal laws regarding
LAFCos, exempt annexations and other land-
use decisions from CEQA, and replace laws
that authorize comprehensive land-use plan-
ning with laws forbidding cities and counties
from conspiring to limit development and
increase housing prices.
Santa Clara County and other counties in
the state should allow developers to subdi-
vide land outside of city limits provided they
pay the cost of providing essential services to
those developments. Those services can be
provided by service districts, and the major
capital costs should be covered by assessing
the buyers of homes and other properties in
the development an annual fee spread over
20 or more years so that (in contrast to
impact fees) the cost does not contribute to
housing affordability problems elsewhere.
2. End subsidies to development and rede-
velopment—Service districts and user fees
should ensure that existing residents do not have
to pay for the infrastructure needed for new devel-
opment. But people who worry that their taxes
might be subsidizing sprawl should be just as
concerned about the huge subsidies going
toward urban redevelopment. Cities that wish to
promote redevelopment should do so through
land-use deregulation, as Anaheim has done,
rather than through tax-increment financing.146
3. Use covenants to protect neighbor-
hoods—Planners developed zoning in the
early part of the 20th century to allow neigh-
borhoods of single-family homes to protect
their property values from high-density and
mixed-use developments, and the Supreme
Court permitted it on those grounds.147
Today, planners use zoning to reduce the
property values of rural landowners without
compensation by downzoning their property
to lesser-valued uses. Planners also use zon-
ing to force high-density and mixed-use
developments on neighborhoods of single-
family homes. Neither of these actions
should be allowed.
An alternative to zoning is protective
covenants, and many neighborhoods in
California are protected by both zoning and
covenants. If the zoning went away, the
covenants would still protect the neighbor-
hood; but if the covenants ended, the neigh-
borhood would be vulnerable to the whims
of government planning commissions.
California should pass new legislation to
forbid downzoning and allow existing home-
owner associations to opt out of urban zon-
ing so that they can take complete control of
their neighborhoods. As suggested by
Professor Robert Nelson of the University of
Maryland, the legislation should also allow
residents of neighborhoods who do not cur-
rently have covenants to form homeowners’
associations, write covenants for their neigh-
borhoods, and then opt out of zoning.148
4. Use private means to protect critical
open space—Around 94 percent of California
is rural open space, and more than half of that
open space is government-owned land that will
probably never be developed. With such an
abundance of open space, government has
many higher priorities than further open space
protection. 
That does not mean no more open space
should be reserved. More areas might need
protection as critical habitat for an endangered
species, highly valued recreation areas, or
urban parks. The best way to ensure that the
most important areas are protected is to rely
on private funds and groups such as The
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Nature Conservancy and various land trusts.
These groups should also explore the use of
less-than-perpetual conservation easements so
that, if needs change, areas reserved as open
spaces could be used for other purposes.
5. Pay for new transportation facilities
with user fees—User fees send signals to
users about how much it costs to provide a
good or service and to producers about how
much people really want or need that good or
service. The one-half-cent sales tax for Santa
Clara County highways successfully reduced
congestion, but VTA easily hijacked the rev-
enue because there was no direct connection
between users and producers. Future road
and transit expansions should be funded as
much as possible out of user fees.
The legislature should create regional toll
road authorities that can sell bonds, build
new roads, and pay for those roads out of the
tolls they collect. If funded exclusively out of
its revenues, a regional authority can be more
nimble than CalTrans and more responsive
to its users than an agency such as VTA,
which is heavily subsidized by tax dollars.
6. Direct mobility subsidies to transit-
dependent people—Not everyone can enjoy
the benefits of automobiles, and one reason
government took control of urban transit was
to provide mobility to low-income, disabled,
and other transit-dependent people. The best
way to provide that mobility would be to give
transit vouchers, similar to food stamps, to
such people. Vouchers could be used for taxi-
cabs, Amtrak, airlines, and public and private
urban transit services. 
7. Introduce competition into the tran-
sit industry—VTA is a legal monopoly,
which discourages innovation and efficiency
in transit service. Companies such as
SuperShuttle, which provides door-to-door
service to Bay Area airports, should be
allowed to provide their services, and accept
vouchers for such services, anywhere in the
Bay Area instead of just to and from airports.
8. Spend discretionary transportation
funds on cost-effective projects—As long as
the federal and state governments provide tax-
supported funding for transportation, Santa
Clara County and other local governments
should use those funds in a cost-effective man-
ner. The Bay Area Metropolitan Transportation
Commission has estimated the cost of various
road, bus, rail, and other transport projects
and how much each project would reduce
congestion, measured in hours of delay.149
Projects should be ranked by their cost per
reduced delay, and only the highest ranked
projects should receive funding. In the mean-
time, VTA should stop spending money on
the proposed BART line, which almost every-
one outside of VTA’s board and the Silicon
Valley Leadership Group agrees would be a
disaster.150
9. End the conflict of interest between
transit and congestion management—The
legislature should either repeal the law
requiring urban counties to have congestion
management agencies or forbid such agen-
cies from affiliating through a common
board or staff with local or regional transit
agencies. Until then, Santa Clara County
should separate VTA from the county’s
CMA. As noted in recommendation 7, the
independent CMA should ensure that any
tax dollars spent on transportation are used
cost-effectively.
10. Control pollution at the tailpipe—
For nearly 40 years, America has used two dif-
ferent approaches to reducing automotive air
pollution: technical improvements to auto-
mobiles and efforts to persuade people to
drive less. The first approach has been wildly
successful and the second an abysmal failure.
It is time to concentrate efforts on the policy
that works.
The problems described here are not
unique to California. Many other states have
passed or are considering laws giving cities
jurisdiction over rural areas, allowing mem-
bers of the public to delay or halt activities on
private land, and offering huge budgets to
transit agencies in the false expectation that
they will reduce congestion. California’s
experience should teach other states that
such laws and policies can have serious unin-
tended consequences for housing, employ-
ment, equity, and transportation.
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California is a beautiful place to live. If the
above changes are made, it can remain a beau-
tiful place to live without being unaffordable,
congested, or heavily taxed. 
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